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ABSTRACT: In my paper, I set The Language Animal against a broader picture of 
Taylor’s intellectual trajectory. Sources of the Self (1989) left three major questions 
open in its wake: (a) the viability of religious moral sources in a ‘secular’ age; (b) the 
compatibility between a robust moral realism and a genealogical account of modern 
identity; (c) the meaning and destiny of the so-called ‘linguistic turn’. This is the framing 
topic of his last book. Although Taylor’s variety of hermeneutics is unquestionably a 
product of the linguistic turn, he has operated with a broad notion of the linguistic 
capacity from the start. Language is, for him, a shared activity and the acknowledgment 
of its animal embeddedness functions in his work as an antidote against any too 
idealized a view of the kind of creatures that humans are. In his earlier writings, 
however, a structural tension lurked below the surface between a Gadamerian notion of 
Sprache and a more phenomenological, Merleau-Pontyan, embodied outlook that was 
less modeled on articulate speech. My claim is that his new book marks a shift from a 
more speech-oriented to a more body-oriented understanding of language. 
 
RÉSUMÉ : Dans mon article, j’analyse The Language Animal sur la base d’une 
considération plus large de la trajectoire intellectuelle de Taylor. Les sources du moi 
(1989) laissait trois grandes questions en suspens : (a) la pérennité des sources 
morales religieuses dans un âge « séculier » ; (b) la compatibilité d’un réalisme moral 
robuste avec un récit généalogique de l’identité moderne ; (c) le sens et le destin du soi-
disant « tournant linguistique ». Cette dernière question est devenue la question-clé de 
son plus récent livre. Bien que la variété de l’herméneutique taylorienne soit 
incontestablement le produit du tournant linguistique, Taylor a travaillé dès le début 
avec une conception large de la capacité linguistique. Le langage est pour lui une 
activité partagée et la reconnaissance de ses origines animales joue dans son travail un 
rôle d’antidote contre une vue trop idéalisée du type de créature que sont les humains. 
Dans ses premiers écrits, cependant, se dissimulait une tension structurelle entre une 
notion gadamerienne de Sprache et une perspective plus phénoménologique, liée à 
Merlau-Ponty et à la notion de parole incarnée, moins modelée sur la parole articulée. 
J’avance que ce nouveau livre de Taylor marque le passage d’une conception du 
language axée sur la parole à une conception davantage axée sur le corps. 
 
Keywords: neo-naturalism, linguistic turn, embodiment, space of reasons, eccentric 
positionality 
 
1. A Book with Deep Roots 
The Language Animal is a rich text, full of insightful and sometimes dazzling 
meditations, not just on linguistic issues but also on the human condition as such. As 
will be clear to those familiar with Taylor’s thought, it is also a multi-layered, stratified 
book. This is no surprise, since the volume was in preparation for decades. 
If I may indulge in a personal memory, I was a doctoral student when I first heard 
about it. I remember the circumstance quite clearly. It was 1995, more precisely June 
1995, and I was at Cerisy-la-Salle, in Normandy. As far as I know, it was the first 
conference ever held on Taylor’s oeuvre and, during an afternoon break, I was patiently 
waiting in line for my turn to talk with him.1 When it was my time to exchange a few 
words of circumstance, I concluded our short chat by asking him what his next project 
was going to be. His prompt reply was: “I am writing a book on language and post-
Romantic poetics.” And it was not just idle talk. A year and a half later, while I was 
visiting the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, I was given the 
minutes of a series of lectures he had delivered there a few months earlier (from 
January to April 1996). Reading today the almost 40 pages of dense notes is an 
instructive exercise. The opening lecture, for example, is a reliable summary of the new 
book’s first chapter. More generally, Taylor’s thoughts about language were scattered 
with anticipations of key concepts that were to re-surface in the years to come, such as 
the now all too familiar ‘buffered self,’ as well as perceptive remarks on the difference 
between symbol, allegory and metaphor. 
So much for my personal recollections. In what follows, I want to set The 
Language Animal against a broader picture of Taylor’s intellectual trajectory. Together 
with Hartmut Rosa, Nick Smith, Ruth Abbey and Arto Laitinen, I belong to the first wave 
of interpreters of his work.2 If I were to indicate the common feature of our overlapping 
efforts with the benefit of hindsight, I think it is the appreciation of Taylor’s unsystematic 
esprit de système. Although it may sound oxymoronic, the choice of words is deliberate. 
What I am drawing attention to through them is the epistemic humility underlying 
Taylor’s synoptic ambition. To use his words, sometimes we have to “spell out the big 
picture” in order to pursue a modest negative goal: i.e., to avoid becoming “unconscious 
of our ultimate assumptions, and in the end confused about them.”3 So, to harp on an 
almost mandatory metaphor,4 I still today see Taylor as a fine specimen of a hedgehog: 
a stubborn but non-aggressive opponent of a powerful but flawed view of human 
agency. His predilection for a mild synoptic view5 ought not to be taken, then, as a 
precondition or an intermediate step towards saying the Last Word. On the contrary it is 
the best way to begin a field exploration. 
Thus, to come closer to the point I want to make here, if you share this kind of 
interest in Taylor’s unusual esprit de système, the first thing you want to know when a 
new book of his comes out is what role it plays in the whole design, what hole it fills, so 
to speak. Now, in order to clarify this claim, let me venture an outrageously thin 
reconstruction of his long argument after his breakthrough book, Sources of the Self. 
I think that this landmark work left three major questions open in its wake. The 
first one was the urge to show why and how God could still be a relevant moral source 
                                                          
1 For the proceedings of the conference, see Laforest and de Lara, Charles Taylor et l'interpretation de 
l'identité modern. 
2 See Rosa, Identität und kulturelle Praxis; Abbey, Charles Taylor; Costa, Verso un’ontologia dell’umano; 
Smith, Meaning, Morals and Modernity; Laitinen, Strong Evaluation without Moral Sources. 
3 I am quoting from his “Foreword” to Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World. See also the self-
interpretation along the same line in Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, p. 2: “My aim here is a modest 
one” (a statement that may sound incongruous when read alongside the book’s title). 
4 See the Introduction to both volumes of Taylor, Philosophical Papers, p. 1: “Despite the appearance of 
variety in the papers published in this collection, they are the work of a monomaniac; or perhaps better, 
what Isaiah Berlin has called a hedgehog.” 
5 See Taylor, “Relations between Cause and Action,” p. 245: “we badly need a mild exercise in synopsis.” 
in a secular age.6 In a confrontational spirit, Quentin Skinner preceded his 1994 
comment on Sources of the Self with a quote from the historian Alexander Kinglake: 
“Important if true.”7 What he meant by this was that one crucial presupposition of 
Taylor’s grand narrativethe theistic optionwas simply out of the game. Taylor took 
seriously the challenge and embarked on a multi-year project aimed at undercutting the 
secularist narrative that decrees religion false simply because it is supposedly outdated, 
‘i.e.’, superseded by the modern mind.8 I know that the reason that this ended up being 
the first goal achieved by Taylor is contingent (I mean ‘contingent’ on the invitation to 
deliver the Gifford Lectures in 1999), but the choice of the subject was not. 
The second large philosophical issue emerging from Sources of the Self was an 
offspring of the book’s original combination of moral realism and historicism. On the one 
hand, the genealogical approach to the question of modern identity attested to Taylor’s 
sensitivity for the contingency and plurality in-built into the human life-form. On the other 
hand, however, this did not undermine Taylor’s robust realist stance towards the human 
struggle for a truth which is not reducible to an idiosyncratic or subjective view. Hans 
Joas has recently coined a suitable label for this unusual stance: affirmative genealogy.9 
It took years to flesh out a philosophical position that was up to the task, but the 
triangulation with the two competing, yet somehow converging, views of Hubert Dreyfus 
and John McDowell has served Taylor well in the meantime. For the “contact theory” 
articulated in Retrieving Realism is a substantial step toward a sophisticated and 
balanced version of the variety of (engaged) realism that was already implicit in the 
interpretation of the Best Account principle given in Sources of the Self.10 
Now, what about The Language Animal? The case I want to make is that the last 
major issue on the table after Sources of the Self was precisely Taylor’s assessment of 
the meaning and philosophical implications of the so-called linguistic turn. If you look at 
the main trajectory of his thought, it is clear that the philosophical anthropology 
developed by him in several influential essays in the late 1970s acted as a bridge 
straddling the gap between the big book on Hegel and the even bigger book on modern 
moral sources.11 It is noteworthy, then, that this creative period was crowned by two 
long papers on language (“Language and Human Nature” and “Theories of Meaning”) 
that incorporated the core of the argument expanded now in the new book.12 In the 
almost 40 years since then, if I am not mistaken, Taylor has returned explicitly to the 
issue of language only three times. (1) In a revelatory exchange with Habermas, titled 
“Sprache und Gesellschaft” (1986).13 (2) In a group of interlocking essays on Herder, 
Wittgenstein and Heidegger written in the early 1990s, which have significant overlap 
                                                          
6 See Taylor, Sources of the Self, chap. 25. 
7 Skinner, “Modernity and Disenchantment,” p. 37. 
8 See Taylor, A Secular Age; Warner, VanAntwerpen, and Calhoun, Varieties of Secularism in a Secular 
Age. A recent useful overview of the political motives underlying Taylor’s view of secularity is Spohn, Den 
säkularen Staat neu denken. 
9 See Joas, The Sacredness of the Person, chap. 4. 
10 See Taylor, Retrieving Realism; Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp. 56-62; Schear, Mind, Reason, and 
Being-In-The-World. 
11 See Taylor, Hegel, especially pp. 565-569, and Taylor, Sources of the Self. 
12 Both the essays are included in Taylor, Philosophical Papers 1, pp. 215-292. The expression “language 
animal” occurs there several times (e.g., “Language and Human Nature,” pp. 216 and 246; “Theories of 
Meaning,” p. 263). 
13 Taylor, “Sprache und Gesellschaft,” especially pp. 50-51. 
with the 1996 lectures I mentioned at the outset.14 (3) And in an unexpected take on 
Brandom’s expressivism, meaningfully called “Language, not Mysterious?” (2008).15 
Taylor himself suggested the label “philosophical anthropology” in the 
introduction to his Philosophical Papers to pinpoint the agenda underlying his broad 
gamut of philosophical contributions.16 And his readers know what this is all about. The 
human being, according to Taylor, is a self-interpreting animal. And this makes her (or 
him) a unique animal inasmuch as her mode of being is deeply shaped by her power of 
articulation. This human articulacy is both an active and passive condition because 
humans’ capacity for strong evaluation is conditional on pre-articulated contexts of life 
(the equivalent of Hegel’s objective spirit) and even people’s responsibility for selfthe 
Heidegger-indebted insight that Dasein is “ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its 
being, that being is at issue for it”17is always a dialectical affair. 
It was clear since the beginning that Taylor was operating with a broad notion of 
language. The combination of the noun “animal” with the qualifier “self-interpreting” was 
therefore not accidental, and it functioned as an antidote to any too idealized or 
intellectualized view of the kind of creature we humans are. In these essays, however, a 
structural tension lurked below the surface between a Gadamerian notion of Sprache 
and a more phenomenological, Merleau-Pontyan, embodied outlook that was less 
modeled on articulate speech and, I think, easier to square with the engaged realism 
mentioned above. Such ambivalence was inherent in the very notions of articulation and 
strong evaluation with which Taylor sought to overcome the representationalism of 
modern philosophy. For there is a sense in which articulacy and the responsiveness to 
a higher worth come before words. 
The tension I am hinting at came to the fore with, and was made more visible by 
the naturalist turn of the 1990s, when a general change of atmosphere fostered a return 
of emphasis on our animal nature at the expense of our more species-specific qualities. 
Now, it would be senseless to maintain that Taylor radically changed his mind in the 
meantime. He did not. Nonetheless, I would venture to say that his new book marks a 
shift from a more speech-oriented to a more body-oriented understanding of language. 
The impression I drew from reading the book is that the variety of sophisticated 
Aristotelian naturalism that was somehow implicit also in his previous writings is more 
prominent now. In a sense, it is a view of language hospitable to an understanding of 
humans as the kind of beings who have a ‘natural’ access to a boundless space of 
reasons, which is, though, mysterious enough to make the materialist or physicalist view 
of nature look inadequate as a moral source. If nature is not just matter in motion, but a 
catch-all concept or, better, metaphor that has to be reconciled with our basic sense of 
reality, then something like a Romantic view of nature is recommended. 
 
2. Language’s Sitz im Leben 
                                                          
14 Taylor, “Lichtung or Lebensform”, especially pp. 74-75; Taylor, “The Importance of Herder;” Taylor, 
“Heidegger, Language, and Ecology.” 
15 Taylor, “Language not Mysterious?.” 
16 Taylor, Philosophical Papers, p. 1: “If one had to find a name for where this agenda falls in the 
geography of philosophical domains, the term ‘philosophical anthropology’ would perhaps be best, 
although this term seems to make English-speaking philosophers uneasy.” 
17 “Dadurch ontisch ausgezeichnet, daß es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht.” 
See Heidegger, Being and Time, § 4 (trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, p. 32). 
A minded body, then. Can we go so far as to claim that this is Taylor’s considered 
response to the challenge posed by our condition as normative animals? Is the 
language animal less a speaking animal than an animal endowed with a gamut of 
mutually sustaining embodied expressive skills? But if this is the case, wouldn’t it make 
sense to look for a more encompassing capability than language to capture the core of 
human nature? These are the questions I wish to focus on in the last section of my 
paper. 
Now, no one can seriously doubt that verbal language (which includes arguing, 
writing and reading) is an astounding human capability. And, still, to ask whether the 
linguistic turn in philosophy helped overestimate the impact of this ability on people’s 
lives is becoming increasingly common among philosophers today. (The misjudgement 
would not be surprising, given that the people who are responsible for the 
overestimation are precisely those whose life revolves around a virtuoso use of higher 
language skills.) However, once verbal language is seen against the wider context of 
the whole human-animal form of lifeI mean, when language is viewed as an 
activityit morphs into a distinctive way of having a common world in view, based on a 
more fundamental form of joint attention that looks less like a detached overseeing than 
a form of immediate contact. 
From this point of view, what Taylor understands as language (in the constitutive 
sense of the word) or linguistic capacity can also be seen as a special way of coping or 
coming to grips with our reasons for acting or believing. What I am gesturing towards 
here is the peculiar condition of openness that Taylor successfully condenses in this 
passage: “the linguistic capacity is essentially more than an intellectual one; it is 
embodied: in enacted meanings, in artistic portrayals, in metaphors which draw on 
embodied experience, and also in the icon gestural portrayal which accompanies 
everyday speech, not to mention the ubiquity of ‘body language’ … which surrounds 
ordinary discourse. From another angle again, the linguistic capacity is essentially 
shared: it sustains a shared consciousness of the world. … This shared understanding 
develops a place for monological speech and writing but the option is available for us 
only because we are inducted into speech as conversation.”18 That said, the fact that a 
form of refined articulation produces impressive results both in terms of depiction 
(Vorstellung) and portrayal (Darstellung) says less about the beings who achieve this 
result than about the self-contained nature of the logical space of reasons. What is 
really remarkable in humans is the amount of things they are able to do together by 
making the most of their shared reasons. 
My impression is that Taylor, with his remarkable philosophical sensitivity, has 
perfectly targeted the elements of the human condition supporting this insight. To begin 
with, there is the way children reach a point of “emotion-infused joint attention”19 or 
“emotion-charged communion”20 by establishing a special connection with their 
caregivers through a constellation of gestures, babbling sounds, cooing, single words, 
facial expressions, bodily contact, enduring or changing emotions, nudging, the shared 
sense of a “zone of proximal development,”21 etc. The basic point here is 
                                                          
18 Ibid., 333. 
19 Ibid., 65. 
20 Ibid., 231. 
21 Ibid., 58. 
sharingbeing together in contact with what is ‘out there’ and what is ‘in here’but the 
long-term goal is “defining and redefining our desires and longings in order to be able to 
live with the pattern of fulfillments and frustrations we undergo. This turns out to be an 
unending human task, which in its later modes we could describe as: finding the 
meanings which can make sensebearable senseof our lives.”22 
A second crucial element is the “ladder of articulative expressions” going from the 
bodily enactment (1), through naming or portraying (2), to the multiple tentative 
explorations of the encompassing (and inexhaustible) landscape of meanings (3). 
Taylor is adamant that “our ordinary grasp of a meaning draws on all three rungs. We 
couldn’t just substitute a verbal account at rung 2 (say, a code) or rung 3 (a rationale for 
the code) and leave behind our embodied understanding of what it is to enact the 
meaning,”23 which, by the way, doesn’t have the sign-and-object structure. The close 
connection between the different rungs of the ladder of articulacy is further corroborated 
by some recent explanations of cultural evolution, in particular those relying on the 
mechanism of cultural neural reuse (that is, the reuse of a neural circuit for supporting a 
newly emerged cognitive function).24 To learn that the brain region involved in reading 
(i.e., the Visual Word Form Area) “subserves other functions such as the processing of 
high-resolution or face recognition,”25 for instance, should come as no surprise for a 
neo-Aristotelian naturalist. 
So, human beings are linguistic animals but, more fundamentally, they are 
animals who are able to inhabit the space of reasons in a distinctive manner. In the last 
pages of the book, Taylor picks up the category of flexibility“a capacity to change, 
even to transform” oneself,26 which is at odds with the rigidity of instinctsto zero in on 
what is unique in the human-animal mind and agency. And, significantly, he finds the 
“theoretical language to come to grips with the evolution of flexibility”27 in Helmuth 
Plessner’s philosophical anthropology, more specifically in his influential notion of 
“eccentric positionality.”28 This is meant to convey the idea that humans are not just 
open to the ‘meaning’ things have for them as centers of agency in their environment. 
They can also step back from these life-meanings and appraise them from a distance, 
i.e., from a different, ‘metabiological,’ point of view. Another kind of openness to the 
reasons for action animals encounter in their dealing with the world is made possible 
thereby. Put another way, being positionally eccentric in one’s own intentional 
environment means to have the world in view in an exceptionally stereoscopic fashion. 
Anyone who endorses Taylor’s claim that there is something mysterious about 
our experience of the world is exercised by the question of whether, after giving up the 
term that dominated the epistemocentric modern philosophy (i.e., consciousness), 
‘language’ is actually the right word to name the mode of being in the world and open to 
it that which is specifically human. Such a condition can be described as a way of being 
in touch with reality that is not the product of a titanic effort on the part of the subject, 
                                                          
22 Ibid., 63. 
23 Ibid., 225. 
24 On cultural evolution see Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind; on nonevolutionary neural reuse see 
Anderson, “Neural Reuse,” and Colagè, “What is Specific about Humans?,” pp. 1008-1012. 
25 Colagè, “What is Specific about Humans?,” p. 1010. 
26 Taylor, The Language Animal, 338. 
27 Ibid., 341. 
28 See Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen, chap. 7. 
but arises from a co-operative and, to a large extent, non-goal-oriented shared activity. 
Herder suggested the unusual German word Besonnenheit (circumspection, 
judiciousness) to describe and denote this variety of intelligence that combines thinking 
and perception, attentiveness and tact, vision and pattern recognition. In the words of 
Taylor: “it is the capacity to focus on objects by recognizing them, and this creates, as it 
were a new space around us.”29 In this space of “clear, calm attention and of distance 
from the immediate instinctual significance of things,”30 reason is spontaneously 
connected with emotions and the sense of a possible horizon of fullness, of a richer 
sense of one’s own world.31 “Reason enters the felt insight”observes Taylor“and 
makes it pliable, expandable, revisable, contestable, clarifiable.”32 The general effect is 
like entering a “landscape, partly hidden by fog, where some features hide others, and 
others again are too distant to be made out exactly. This ‘landscape’ implies a double 
call on us: first, to live up to this sense of what is important; and second, to get it more 
clearly in focus. This involves changing ourselves in these two dimensions … two 
transformations … interconnected; part of the fruit of getting better is sensing better, 
and vice versa.”33  
“Language” is a plausible candidate to lexically designate this composite pattern 
of activity. But we cannot exclude that there is a better word in our dictionaries or that 
one may be coined for this purpose in the close or distant future. At any rate, what we 
are looking for is a concept that allows us to do justice to the multifaceted image of the 
human condition skillfully outlined by Taylor in his last book. Humans, it seems, are 
animals who possess a peculiar form of stereopsisnot only perceptual but intellectual. 
This species-specific ‘binocular’ sight goes beyond the interaction of a sensory eye with 
the eye of reason. It also develops from multiple ways of entering the space of reasons 
(through emotions, storytelling, rites, action, symbolism, art, insight, conversation, 
regimented discourse, etc.) and the subtle play of resonance, endorsement and 
recognition coming out of it. This creates the conditions for a potentially infinite realm of 
connectedness and commonality and a new way of expressively inhabiting the physical 
world. Plessner coined for it the term “Exzentrische Positionalität.”34 I think he came 
close thereby to capturing the gist of the condition of beings whom Pico della Mirandola 
famously pictured in his “Oration on the Dignity of Man” as indiscretae opus imaginis: 
creatures of indeterminate nature.35 
The Eccentric Animalthis, I think, would have been another fitting title for 
Taylor’s engaging book. 
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